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THE ROLE OF J\ffiDIATION IN OVERCO:MING BARRIERS 
TO THE SETTLEMENT OF LEGAL DISPUTES: 
A CASE BASED APPROACH 
By William D. LeMoult • 
This paper was inspired by observations resulting from the mediation of more than I 00 
civil legal disputes in five states (Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts and Rhode 
IsJand) involving personal injury, wrongful death, property, landlord/tenant, workers' 
compensation, medical malpractice, attorney malpractice, contract, attorney's fee, employment, 
civil assault and battery, collective bargaining, and real estate. All negotiating parties involved in 
the mediations were attorneys and/or claims personnel employed by insurance carriers, and the 
parties they represented. 1 
Original inquiry involved the attempt to discern factors which kept litigants from settling 
their disputes, and distinguishing them in tenns of case type. But the barriers to settlement were 
indistinguishable from case to case. In addition, there were often ·several barriers present in a 
given case, each presenting its own set of problems and requiring the employment of varying 
mediation skills. 
A syllogism of sorts developed in the process of relating mediation to the problems 
experienced by litigants attempting to resolve their conflicts. Namely, that if settlement of a 
litigable matter was to be achieved at all, the notion that mediation could contnbute presupposed 
that there were obstacles to timely settlement through direct negotiation which could be overcome 
by the intervention of a third party. Put another way, mediation appeared unnecessary unless there 
were barriers which inhibited direct negotiation and settlement in a timely fashion. 2 One 
exception to this notion involved those cases where representatives of the parties were willing to 
settle, but for a variety of reasons wanted a forum to achieve this objective. Reasons included 
client distrust, a lack of client control, and efforts at keeping clients fully involved and informed. 
This paper discusses the barriers to direct settlement (which are sometimes also barriers to 
effective mediation) and reconunends the role of mediation in helping to overcome those barriers. 
Hopefully it will contribute in some small way to the timely settlement of conflict and an improved 
image of attorneys in pursuit of their clients' best interests. 
This Article received the Hoehlein Award for Distinguished paper at the 1995 Annual Conference 
of the North East Academy of Legal Studies in Business in Kiamesha Lake, New York. 
*Assistant Professor ofLaw, Lubin School ofBusiness, Pace University, Pleasantville, N.Y. 
Finally, this paper does not distinguish matters that are not suitable for mediation. The 
point of view that seems most valid on this issue is that all matters may be properly mediated save 
those in which either party can achieve satisfuction only through a binding declaration. 3 
I. Barriers 
1. 
2. 
"' 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
The barriers to settlement oflegal disputes discussed herein are: 
Delays in litigation; 
Differences regarding valuation/remedy; 
Posturing; 
Individuals with ultimate authority who do not participate directly in neootiations referred 
to as "Phantom Negotiators"; 0 ' 
Limits on authority to settle; 
Egos; 
Attorney's personal economic interest; 
of parties to properly prepare cases; 
Phenomena regarding multi-party cases. 
The presence or absence of these barriers is not a signal that an attorney or party has done 
something "wrong" or "right"; they are simply part of the fabric of litigation. Representatives of 
parties who pursue their clients' best interests, and who thoughtfully analyze the environments 
which affect those interests, should examine barriers to settlement as well. and consider the o! mediation would constitute an effective vehicle for the obstacles 
which inhib1t a satiSfactory and mutually agreeable solution. It is the failure to identifY and 
acknowledge these barriers that is largely responsible for protracted negotiations and resistance to 
facilitated settlement. 4 
A. Delay in Litigation 
0 
A issue revolves around the notion of delay. It is well known that 
95 Yo of allliugated matters are never pursued to judgment. 5 If the number of claims and conflicts 
parties before the commencement of litigation was documented, the percentage of 
untned lihgable matters would be greater. Since all litigab)e matters not tried or discharged under 
the law are settled, it is reasonable to ask what motivation exists to seek mediation if the parties 
can reasonably expect that the controversy will ultimately be resolved without mediation. The 
answer depends on what is meant by "ultimately," what the nature of the other barriers to settlement are, and how they affect the client's interest in the case. 
The extent of societal damage be.ing created by delay in the litigatory process is unclear.6 
Factors contnbut.ing to delay include court congestion caused by the enormous volume of cases in 
the court system7 and the panoply of mechanisms available to litigants in the adversarial process. 8 
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It is not necessary to analyze the myriad justifications for delay or the use of legal 
mechanisms which contribute to delay since attorneys can always evaluate their conduct against a 
single ethical standard: Is the conduct in the best interest of the client? Permitting or contributing 
to excessive delay with regard to matters that will, in all likelihood, settle privately seems not to 
comply\vi.th the standard. 
A possible measure, then, of whether delay is excessive might be the extent to which it serves the 
interest of the client. An individual injured in an auto accident may have sustained latent damages 
not readily identifiable. Here, resolution cannot be achieved until the nature and extent of damages 
is known or reasonably foreseeable. Consider, however, a property damage case in 
which one of five defendants has taken a no-pay position. The parties wrangle bilaterally for years 
over damages alleged to be $20,000. Each party is, or should be, acutely aware of the likelihood 
of settlement, the improbability of a trial, and the disservice to clients resuhing from tbe failure to 
seriously attempt multilateral settlement efforts. Yet the case drags on with no party undertaking a 
serious settlement initiative. The case assumes a life of its own independent ofthe interests of the 
parties. There are adverse economic consequences to defendants and plaintiffs for whom the 
concept of the present value of money is furever lost. Between these extremes there is, of course, 
a plethora of possible scenarios; but all are measurable against the client interest standard. 
Mediation provides an escape from the spiral of excessive delay and serves to crystallize 
issues, focus on client interest, and achieve closure. Mediation brings parties together, relieves 
tension, focuses on issues which separate the parties, and seeks win·win phenomena. It has as its 
primary focus the interests of all clients and the most satisfactory solution possible in light of 
competing interests. Most importantly, results can be achieved in a timely fashion. 
Excessive delay, however, is not a cause of failure to settle, it is a result. While there are 
forces inherent in the litigation process which contribute to delay, parties are still free at anytime 
to discuss and settle differences. Why, then, does it take so long? Why is the route to settlement 
often such a tortuous one? 
There are other barriers which can be effectively overcome by the use of mediation, and 
which contribute to excessive delay. 
B. Valuation and Remedy 
It seems reasonable to assume that differences regarding the settlement value or outcome 
of a particular claim or lawsuit contnbute more than any other single factor to the fu.ilure to settle. 
Absent this element there is no reason for litigants to cominue, and the pursuit of litigation 
without legitimate differences regarding the outcome seems again to violate the client interest test. 
Yet it is true that mediation efforts take place regarding litigation that has been in process 
for years without settlement demands or offers ever having been exchanged.10 The reasons for a 
failure to negotiate are sometimes legitimate and in the client's best interest. But very often they 
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are not, and ethical advocates should universally examine the issue of client interest as it applies to 
settlement initiatives, particularly in light of the statistical data regarding the likelihood of trial. 
Since the process of settlement necessarily involves negotiations, and attorneys are 
nurtured on notions of strategy, there is an ever present danger that the objective of achieving a 
realistic outcome in the best interest of the client may become subordinate tO achieving what is 
believed to be a strategic advantage. Making the first settlement ovenure, for example, may be 
perceived as indicating a weak position. The results of this attitude on both sides is, of course, 
inertia. 
If reasonable settlemem is an option in the best interest of the client, it cannot be achieved 
without an initiative from one side and response from the other. However, once expressed or 
pursued it may be that a negotiating strategy or posture is forever damaged. (Lawyers and claims 
personnel are batmted by the prospect of offering more tban is minimally acceptable to the other 
side, even though such a condition should be idyllic from the perspective of the parties). Or it may 
be that a demand or offer will later operate to haunt the negotiating parties to their detriment at a 
pre-trial conference. 11 Mediation obviates most problems inherent in valuation issues. Skillful 
mediators will not lead parties into positions which will be detrimental to future negotiations or 
processes, and a skillful use of the con£dential nature of the proceedings will leave all sides in a 
condition of parity. One complex personal injury mediation involving six defendants was 
conducted over a period of eight hours without a single demand or offer being exchanged among 
the parties. Barriers to settlement involved perceptions of value as well as comparative 
contribution of the defendants. Although settlement was not achieved, issues were crystallized, 
and infonnation obtained in the mediation was the foundation upon which the eventual settlement 
wasbuih. 
It is most often true that valuation of a case is a highly subjective matter, and that no party 
to the action can forecast the likely outcome with clarity. Speculation regarding probabilities and 
possibilities of recovery is fueled by the interplay between issues ofliability and damages, and the 
vagaries of jury behavior and venue. 
Holmes circumscribes the dilemma of case evaluation when he defines the law: 
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in filet, and nothing more pretentious, are what 
I mean by the 
Addressing his concept of the relationship between law and logic, Holmes .is plain: 
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a 
conciliion in a contract. Buy why do you imply it? Is it because of some 
belief as to the practice of the community or a class, or because of some 
opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a 
matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not 
capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are 
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battle' grounds where the means do not exist for determinations that shall 
be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more than embo_dy 
the preference of a given body in a given time and place. We do not realize 
how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon slight change 
in the habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is self evident, no 
be • 13 matter how ready we may to accept It . 
Mediation acknowledges the wisdom ofHoJmes. It provides a forum for the honest repose 
of uncertainty and the quiet impartial evaluation of prophecy. Competent mediators will maximize 
the benefits to be derived from the judicious use of confidentiality/4 drawing the parties closer 
and closer based on the exercise of their own reason as well as the mediators.15 Mediation is also 
an excellent forum for discussing matters that are relevant yet outside the actual merits of the 
case, such as the likelihood of an adverse judgment in a jurisdiction for bias in favor of 
plaintiffs or defendants. 
C. The Perils of Posturing 
If we can accept a dictionary definition of"posturing" as acting "in an affected or artificial 
manner as to create a certain impression," 16 then it is probably safe to say that every negotiator of 
a legal dispute is posturing to some degree up to that point beyond further. concessions _will 
not be made and positions will not change; it is at that point that final IS 
each party to a negotiation legitimately seeks to get as much as possible while conc_eding as little 
as possible J 7 it is necessary during the negotiation to communicate in a manner which represents 
' 18 thi d' . fi . f the something short of the negotiator's final impasse position. The e cs an pro ctency o . 
negotiation process have been explored by scholars and it is plain that not all negotiators perceive 
the ethics of negotiation in the same light, or are equally compelent in that process.19 The danger 
for negotiators lies not so much in the perception of their own attributes in these matters, as in the 
perception of their adversaries'. 
The very notion of disequilibrium between and among negotiators constitutes a barrier 
that Mnookin might refer to as "cognitive. "20 Thus, as negotiators wend their way through the 
mine fields of adversarial discourse, creating images as they go which represent something other 
than their ultimate concerns opportunities for error and miscalculation are created. When these 
are combined with the dllEcutties inherent in principa1/agent relationshlps21 there arises a 
permutation of barriers to timely and effective negotiation and settlement that sometimes become 
so insurmountable a trial is unavoidable.22 
In one case involving recovery of an ,attorney's fee and a cmmterclaim of attorney 
malpractice, the parties had become so hostile during. civil 
discussion was impossible. This continued through the JOmt session of the medtat10n, the 
caucus phase, degenerating eventually into a notion of killing the Medtatlon m 
early stages of this relationship, before the parties had become encrusted m a reverence of their 
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own posturings, would have stood an excellent chance of success, and would have preserved a 
friendship between former business associates. 
Barriers to effective negotiations and sett.'ement, whether among those specifically 
discussed or th?se formulating part of the accouterment of the coi111llllDication process, 
have a uruversal quality about them in that they operate to damage relationships between 
adversaries to some degree, if not irreparably. 
Professor Fuller describes the "central quality of mediation" as: 
... its capacity to reorient the Parties toward each other, not by 
imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and 
shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will 
redirect their attitudes and disposition toward one another.23 
This "new and shar.:J perception" is largely a product of structuring the posturings of the 
parties.' and a parity in negotiating techniques and competencies, thereby intercepting 
potential barriers m such a way as to appeal to the negotiators' most productive and rational 
inclinations. 24 
This view is reinforced by generally accepted notions oftbe mediator's functions. Stulberg 
relates them. as being that of educator, translator, expander of resources, bearer of bad news, 
agent of reality and scapegoat. 25 
D. Phantom Negotiators 
Another obstacle to negotiated settlement, that sometimes also inhibits mediation, is the 
specter of phantom negotiators, i.e., individuals who are in control of the outcome of a 
do participate in In thes.e are conducted by 
mdivtduals with or Without any gtven authonty, and It 1S left to the negotratmg party either to 
achieve preordained objectives or persuade the phantom of the rationale for movement to other or 
broader objectives. 'These structures are often logistically necessary, but a barrier nonetheless. 
. The notion of compromise implies that the compromiser is equipped with all available 
influences which permit a reasoned judgment and the ability to achieve closure. In the settlement 
of legal disputes every discussion or communication contains its own environment as well as 
reasoning, and the evaluation of positions is best done by those who are in a position to assess 
both. 
One mediation where a good faith effort by both sides over several hours proved 
successful was swnmarily undone by a 1 0-second telephone call from the plaintiff to a relative 
with an obviously preconceived notion of value. 
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Mediators provide a sounding board to those with authority who are not actively involved. 
In addition, the representations of mediators are more thoughtfully and thoroughly considered by 
phantom negotiators than are the representations of the adversary, or sometimes even their own 
• 26 representatives. 
Also, mediators can often talk directly with phantom negotiators, which generally is not an 
option available in direct negotiations due to considerations involving the Wldennining of 
authority. One two-party personal injury mediation occurred at the office of the defendant 
insurance carrier. The claims representative was unusually intransigent and matters were 
proceeding badly. This mediator went to the kitchen for a cup of coffee and, by chance, met the 
claims representative's supervisor who was fumiliar with the case. The three of us met thereafter 
and in five minutes ironed out a more reasonable and realistic approach. It seemed the claims 
person bad authority for more than he bad revealed, and bad apparently been through a tough 
negotiation with plaintiff's counsel. 
E. Limits on Authority 
Plaintiffs and defendants generally will not reveal to each other limits on authority. Most 
often they negotiate as if there were none, although each side is strictly bound and must, at some 
juncture, or through prior experience, wrestle with the prospect of the other side's natural 
boundaries. 
Mediation is a method of ferreting out those secret logistical barriers in an environment of 
strict con£dentiality, evaluating their validity in light of the corpus of the argument, and using the 
information in the best interests of settlement rather than strategy. Effective mediators test the 
validity of negotiators' constraints and may pose to those with ultimate authority the bases for 
modification or abandonment of disputed positions. 
In one two-party medical malpractice mediation, the parties negotiated in good faith, 
finally becoming positioned at numbers which vlltually demanded a compromise to which both 
seemed to be pointing. At this juncture both parties had to stop negotiating to seek authority from 
their principals. The principals eventually consented to this obvious compromise, but it was four 
years after the injury had occurred. 
The matter of limits on authority applies to plaintiffs as well as defendants. With regard to 
plaintiffs, it is often true that lay persons have envisioned some dollar value that seems a 
reasonable settlement to them, and which bears no relationship to reality. In an action involving 
liability under a life insurance policy a beneficiary had become entrenched in a demand which 
Cl)rresponded to. his needs for an annual income. The number bore no relationship to the prospect 
of what the case was worth in light of the facts and law. After five years of litigation the matter 
was settled in one mediation session after the beneficiary's personal representative, a relative, 
acquired an in depth understanding of the issues. 
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. With regard to defendants, limits on authority are often rational boundaries thoughtfully 
concexved, but sometimes they are arbitrarily derived and refer more to the negotiator that the 
case value. For example, a claims person might have a limit on authority based on some arbitrary 
standard such as tenure with the insurance compan, . 
. Limits on authority, even those with a foundation in precedent, should be kept flexible for 
because ?f the uniqueness of every case. In the world of negotiation, parties focus on 
the vanables and most acutely those which have any prospect of 
affecting then: mtemal prophecteS. It IS the strength or attractiveness of these variables which 
command the need for .flexibility. 
F. Egos27 
In a perfect world, notions of egotism of the negotiator would never enter upon the field 
of a bo.na fide. negotiation. In of it is often true that concerns of self worth, or 
reputation, or unage, play a part m cons1deratJ.ons of success. Negotiations often reverberate with 
contempt for the other side, or their poshion, based not upon a realistic prognosis of the outcome 
but on sw::h matters as the opposing negotiators stature, apparent skill, level of education: 
erudrt10n, expenence, personality, or communications technique. The fucus in negotiations 
or all or any part of the contest, confusing sometimes the lawyers' and 
clients mterests. If W1llillllg and not losing is the overriding consideration, the most legitimate 
for is a trial or other binding process; but this is antithetical to the reality that 
95% of alllittgatiDn never goes to trial The negotiation, therefure, sometimes becomes the field 
of upon adversaries test each others' mettle for no truly productive 
knowmg all the while that the likelihood of a trial is remote. ' 
. . to projec:t an image to their clients of infullibility or 
use of mterferes wtth such pretensions. In one mediation involving a 
very senous mJury, the plaintiffs credibility was the focus of the defendant's resistance to 
Although. was .evidence on both sides regarding the facts, it was clear that if a 
JUlY believed verston of events (which was distinctly possible) the defendant was 
to senous liability. the course of the mediation the defendant insurance claims person 
and his attorney made a nwsance-value offer which the plaintiff responded to with a modified 
.. The defendant thereafter refused to move based on the credibility issue. This left the 
m almost exactly the same position she had been in prior to the mediation. When the 
plaintiff ":fused to "bid against herself' the defendant's counsel terminated the mediation, saying 
to her claims person "I told you mediation wouldn't work." The insurance carrier later admitted 
that the case was not suitable for mediation in light of counsel's feelings. 
Sometimes the barrier to settlement is found in one party's interest in a remedy which not 
only compensates for client damages, but which also seeks to embarrass the other party or as 
often, the other party's representative. Arbitrator Joseph Pastore tells of a recent conflict 'which, 
although within reach of settlement, raged for over two years because the plaintiff sought, in the 
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mind of the defendant, a reasonable solution but with an added twist designed to "rub the 
settlement in the face" of defendant's counsel. When the case reached arbitration and my colleague 
as arbitrator suggested that an ad hominem remedy was not only unlikely but unprofessional, the 
parties settled the case in minutes. 
Mediation defuses most, and sometimes all, of these barriers because mediation eliminates 
the battlefield. There is nothing from which the ego can seek reflection. Focus is away from 
psychic obstructions and toward substantive issues upon which agreement is sought. "Winning" 
and "losing" surrender to "agreeing." In mediation there is usually a "joint session," where parties 
present their overall argumems, followed by "caucuses" with the parties individually. There's no 
benefit to be derived from extraneous behaviors by advocates in caucuses. While acting-out 
occasionally occurs in mediation, it almost invariably subsides with regard to those who are 
involved in good faith efforts at settlement. 
G. Attorney's Economic Interest 
It is part of the process of the law that lawyers are necessarily compensated for their skill 
in conditions of both success and failure. Indeed, the rewards for :fuilure often exceed those for 
success, and failure and unnecessary delay are often the allies of enhanced attorney compensation. 
Since dilatory lawyering is older by centuries than any code of ethics, it seems fair that this article 
will not cause in any measure the refurm of those who abuse their trust by failing to resolve 
resolvable matters or advise clients of ways to end litigation when such tactics appear 
warranted.28 
Notwithstanding attorney duties and obligations, lawyers need to cast their vision to other 
horizons. ADR offers an opportunity to improve service to clients, and in an industry which offers 
that product alone there is a broad opportunity for change in focus to achieve improved market 
share through offering clients better ways to meet their needs. Uhimately, the satisfaction of client 
needs (to the extent possible) is the mission and purpose of every representation, and in rapidly 
changing client and social environments, those who can adapt will be the survivors in this 
increasingly competitive profession. 29 It seems axiomatic that the notion of improved service 
implies reduced costs and the requirement that firms will seek vehicles for maintainiDg profitability 
without diminished service. 
H. Failure to Prepare Properly 
The fiillure of attorneys and claims representatives to prepare a case properly is often 
based on the very knowledge of the plodding nature of legal processes. As time passes, and files 
thicken, substance and strategy sometimes become disconnected. Words and communications 
circumvent the gravamen of cases, and parties tend to lose track of just what, exactly, the case is 
all about, often to the detriment of those represented. This is particularly true for parties handling 
large numbers of cases and cases with·small economic values. 
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In a mediation involving six insurance carriers, one of the claims representatives made 
opening remarks that had nothing to do with the case at bar. When c.orrected by others present, 
the representative deferred to them to set out the case. A thirty-minute break was suggested in 
order to give the first claims representative time to refamiliarize herself with the issues. During 
two subsequent caucuses with this clailm person, she kept confusing the instant case with others 
she was handling. She subsequently advised this mediator that she was handling 350 cases and 
expected the load to possibly increase due to a reorganization at her office. 
In another case a multi-party mediation was conducted and continued so that a party could 
seek additional authority. In' the interi:m, the case file changed hands and subsequent discussion 
with the new representative focused on issues of liability. The representative was adamant about 
the minima] exposure of his client. Further dlscussion revealed that although he knew details of 
the case he was mistaken about which party he represented. Undaunted (and now in the throes of 
the Ego barrier) he continued the same argument although it was obviously inapplicable. 
Mediation helps to refocus on cases in a timely fashion, giving them the importance to 
which clients are entitled. Because the process is informal, parties re-explore the vital issues in a 
noncombative environment. Timely mediations also circwnvent most problems inherent in the 
practice of reassigning files among attorneys and insurance claims representatives. Mediations 
tend to be most fruitful when the parties are represented by advocates with an ongoing, thorough 
familiarity with the facts and issues, unless settlement negotiations have been chronically 
unproductive, in which case new fares and voices may be appropriate. In a memorable case, this 
mediator was seated in the lobby of a large law firm waiting for the parties to arrive, and a woman 
entered and sat down. We made small talk, and were soon joined by an attorney who idenillied 
as a party to the mediation The woman introduced herself as the plaintiff and complained 
bitterly that the case bad been in litigation for more than four years. She then asked the attorney 
who his client was. "You" was the reply. The case settled in 55 minutes. 
The preparation required of mediation is simply that of knowledge. The burdens of trial 
preparation are absent. Eloquence and strategy give way to reasoning and dialogue, as 
the parties strive to discover whether the prophecies descnbed by Holmes are within their mutual 
contemplation. · 
I. Phenomena Regarding Mu1ti-Panv Cases 
All of the barriers to effective settlement heretofore discussed compound and become 
more forbidding as parties are added to a lawsuit. There are, in addition, certain barriers that are 
unique to these cases and are created simply by virtue of the numbers of parties in interest. 
1. Complexity of Communications 
Co1lliDWlications among parties in multi-party cases become a logistical cballenge, often 
avoided by litigants in favor oftime spent creating further support for entrenchment. 
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Consider, fur example, a personal injury in a leased portion of a building undergoing 
renovation. Parties to the action may include the General Contractor, all relevant subcontractors, 
the architect(s), landlord(s), tenant(s), manufacturers of objects connected with the injury, 
municipalities, and others brought in directly or by impleader. Each adopts an initial position 
which, iJ)so fucto, has relevance to the position of the others both in law and in met. Bilateral 
discussions are virtually impossible because of the multilateral, nature of the 
controversy. Within this population there seems invariably to be one or more parties who resist 
collective efforts to resolve the dispute. Unstructured multilateral negotiations without a neutral 
are fraught with difficulties. 30 
There is an unheralded skill extant possessed exc1usively by the Case Administrators of 
good ADR providers whose job it is to bring together in one forum the warring interests in multi-
party litigation. Their efforts, which are often threshold mediations in and of themselves, combine 
many of the skills of effective mediators, with an emphasis on patience, tenacity, perception, and 
knowledge of the subject matter. 
Mediation serves, therefore, not only as a forum for settlement, but also as a vehicle for 
bridging complex relationships, bringing adversaries to the table for discussion where they might 
otherwise have been unwilling, and moving along those advocates who, by virtue of the 
complexity of communications, are inclined to delay the inevitable, to the detriment of their 
clients. 
2. TheoriesofR&hrthmY 
A significant barrier to settlement in multi party negotiations is the perception that 
defendants bear a certain proportionate liability relative to each other. This view, which is 
dependent on, and as imperfect as, estimates . of overall case value, sometimes maintain 
irrespective of the amount of dollars a defendant has to spend. For example, it is not uncommon, 
even in mediation, that parties will state their dollar contnbution to an overall settlement, only to 
recant upon learning of the contribution of other defendants who they believe bear a greater share 
of the burden. The dilemma is complicated when those who seem to contribute a comparatively 
low ammmt are constrained by limits on their authority imposed, sometimes, by phantom 
negotiators. In these cases the dispute is not with the plaintiff and may have no inunediate bearing 
on settlement value. 
In one personal injury matter involving five defendants and one plainti:ft: the parties were 
asked to write a confidential note stating their view regarding the value of the case, their 
individual peroent of liability, and the relative liability of the remaining defendants. There was no 
consensus regarding the case value, and little accord on comparative liability. The parties were 
then asked privately bow their estimates of their own liability stacked up against specific 
settlement values. Every party was prepared to pay their own estimate of their own liability 
relative to their estimated case value, which collectively constituted an appropriate settlement 
value for the case. The parties then all agreed to reveal their confidential evaluations. When some 
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parties realized that their estimated case values were greater than the values of others, thereby 
giving them a proportionately greater share, those parties balked. A mutually satisfactory 
compromise was subsequently reached which focused more on the parties attitudes regarding 
value to them rather than the perceptions of others. This is not to say that perceptions of relative 
liability do not have quantitative dimensions and are not valid considerations in case settlement. 
The point is that there are other dimensions of liability in multi-party cases that need to be focused 
on and addressed. 
There are effective techniques in mediation to bring defendants to a point of agreement 
regarding relative contn'bution within the context of a total settlement. PJ.amly these are fluid in 
nature, and change and move within the framework of the entire mediation and shifting attitudes 
in response to the plaintiffs demands. But there is a group dynamic31 that occurs involving group 
pressure, values and attitudes32 which, if understood and effectively managed by the mediator, will 
tend to bring the parties to agreed upon nonns, 33 a central logic, and recognition of the 
desirability of facing square-on their mutual BA1NAs (Best Alternatives To a Negotiated 
Agreement).34 
Conclusion 
To effectively represent a client, or an employer, attorneys and insurance claims personnel 
should examine the barriers to settlement and consider the prospect of mediation as a legitimate 
vehicle for overcoming the barriers, particularly in light of settlement statistics. Strategies of 
delay, until the pressure of trial serves as an enforcer, often fuil to inure to the benefit of 
principals, and must be questioned against the standard of the best interest of the client. 
*Some of the concepts discussed were first presented at a seminar sponsored by the 
Connecticut Bar Association, Continuing Education Series, regarding ''Settling Insurance Claims 
and Lawsuits," May 20, 1993. 
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PROTECTING THE CONSUMER: 
BUYER AGENCY IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
by 
Robert D. King* 
I. Introduction 
The single most important investment for most Americans is the purchase of a home. 
The decision to buy a home requires substantial financial consideration. Similarly, one who 
sells a home must consider the financial consequences. It is inappropriate, therefore, that such 
an important financial transaction is in many instances conducted in a manner which is 
inconsistent with prevailing notions of agency theory and which does not aocurately reflect the 
Wlderstanding of the buyer, the seller, and the real estate professional. 
The typical residential real estate transaction promotes this inconsistency through the 
use of"listing brokers" and "cooperating or selling brokers," the latter of whom are deemed to 
be "sub-agents" of the listing broker.1 In this transaction, the seller designates a broker to act 
as his or her exclusive agent in marketing the property. A listing agreement setting forth the 
of the parties is executed.2 This broker is referred to as the "listing broker," and is 
legally recognized as the agent of the seller in the sale of the property.3 The listing agreement 
typically requires the listing broker to place the listing in the local Muhiple Listing Service 
("MLS"). TID:ough the MLS, selling brokers learn that the property is for sale and are advised 
of the conditions and terms of the offer to selL The selling brokers who market the property to 
prospective buyers are deemed sub-agents of the listing broker and, consequently, sub-agenlS 
of the seller, to whom they owe a fiduciary obligation. 4 
The typical real estate sale involves the prospective buyer contacting the sub-agent and 
requesting that the sub-agent assist the buyer in locating suitable property that is for sale. The 
reviews properties listed for sale in the MLS and presents them to the buyer for 
consideration. If the buyer decides to bid on a property, the sub-agent then prepares the 
buyer's offer to purchase, often after having counselled the buyer on the purchase bid as 
compared with similar properties in the area. As negotiations with the seller over the terms of 
the proposed sale continue, the sub-agem often negotiates on behalf of the buyer.5 
*Professor ofBus.iness Law, The Richard Stockton College of New Jersey 
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